

field for analysis with regard to arms transfer diplomacy between the major arms suppliers and their respective clients, the combatants. On one end of a spectrum, there is the titanic, brutal eight-year-long struggle between Iran and Iraq that resulted in at least a million battlefield deaths, in which the resupply of arms to the combatants comprised something like 20% of the total of global arms sales over a period of several years. On the other end, there were the brief skirmishes between El Salvador and Honduras and between Tanzania and Uganda, neither of which involved truly significant intrawar arms transfers.

For each of their cases, the authors provide a four-phased analysis: (1) the background to the war, its causes, and the diplomatic runup to the initiation of hostilities; (2) the prewar balance of power and sources of weapons on both sides; (3) the patterns of weapons acquisitions in the period immediately preceding the war; (4) the course of the war itself and the relationship between diplomacy and intrawar arms flows. Each case study hews closely to this format, and the result is an excellent comparison of the wars, which interweaves the course of the wars themselves, their contextual diplomacies, and the flow of weapons. As a basis for comparison, the authors examine symmetric and asymmetric patterns of supplier behavior as applied to arms resupply and embargoes (which provides a picture of which, if either, side of the war is advantaged or disadvantaged by arms resupply diplomacy), which patterns are related to prewar advantages on one side or another with regard to weapons, negotiations during the war over weapons resupply, and finally the wars' outcomes. The authors are then able to hypothesize about the factors leading to deescalation of conflict: arms supply strongly favoring one side (particularly defenders), dependence on single suppliers, high war attrition and painful stalemate, and embargoes and international pressures.

Of particular interest are the analyses in the various cases of the mixed motives of the various big-power arms producer states that must decide whether or not to conduct arms resupply operations on behalf of erstwhile client states. There are commercial motives; but also, a major power may wish to see a certain state win or at least not lose a war so as (1) to bolster its own image of power, credibility, or reliability; (2) to bolster existing relationships with combatants or third parties; (3) to test and prove weapons or doctrines under fire; or (4) to forestall resort to nuclear weapons or outside intervention. By the same token, suppliers may refuse resupply for fear of being drawn into open-ended commitments, depleting their own weapons stocks, exacerbating conflicts with big-power rivals or with worried allies, violating principles of legal or ethical restraint, allowing capture of classified technologies, and so on. There are excellent discussions of these dilemmas, for instance, with respect to U.S. policies toward Israel in 1973 and Pakistan in 1965, Soviet policies toward Iraq after 1980 and Ethiopia during the Horn War, and the crucial nature of U.S. arms assistance to Britain during the Falklands War.

Among the authors' conclusions, to the extent allowed by the small sample size and the diversity of the cases, are that arms suppliers have relatively little leverage over the outcome of hostilities but that the effect of arms supplies on the level of hostility and the occurrence of negotiated settlements varied across cases. Arms deliveries were seen clearly as a factor in decisions to go

to war, because of considerations about military superiority and perceptions of changes in the balance of power. Arms deliveries were seen as generally having prolonged and intensified the fighting in many cases. And in general, arms embargoes tended to have stronger effects on short wars and those fought with more sophisticated equipment (Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan), while economic embargoes ultimately had more effect in longer wars (Iran-Iraq) and those among very poor recipients (Tanzania-Uganda, El Salvador-Honduras). Finally, warring parties were found usually able to find new, albeit probably inferior, arms sources in time to keep most wars going despite efforts to stop the fighting by big-power arms suppliers.

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**European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe.** Edited by Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith. London: Sage, 1994. 312p. \$22.95 paper.

It has by now become a commonplace in the study of international relations that the end of the Cold War should lead to a reexamination of international relations theories. For better or worse, such a reexamination is now in full swing, with the principal focus of debate being theories of international systems. By contrast, theories of foreign policymaking have largely escaped this *perestroika*, a fact that makes the appearance of this book a welcome one; for it is "concerned primarily with foreign policy theory," the aim being "to examine the extent to which the main theories of foreign policy can explain two sets of developments: the end of the Cold War in Europe and the increasing integration of West European states" (p. 1). Which, if any, theories stand up to this test, and how, if at all, should they be modified?

In a symposium volume such as this, one should not expect complete unity of views. Understandably, the authors cover a number of different empirical domains: European states, multinational corporations, and the European Union. Less understandably, though, there is little-to-no agreement on just *what* theories of foreign policy are or should be under examination. The problem here is not, as might be imagined, a surfeit of theories but an almost extreme paucity. One finds only the most cursory references to standard theories of decision making, of bureaucratic politics, of cybernetic processes, of psychodynamics, or of learning. Instead, the various studies tend to operate with a notion of foreign policy making as *zweckrational* activity by individual actors, who, subjected to pressures and opportunities both at home and abroad, pursue goals as best they can. Thus, "the main theories of foreign policy" are, in fact, not examined; and the stated purpose of the book is not achieved.

In and of itself, this failure would not be dire. After all, one might still expect that the individual studies would shed light on particular foreign-policy-related events and processes, even if they have little to say about foreign policymaking in the abstract. To some degree, this hope is borne out, notably in the chapters on Nordic reactions to the Soviet coup attempt, on Swedish candidacy for the European Community, and on Eastern European policies during the final years of the Cold War (by Hans Mouritzen, Bengt Sundelius, and Olav F. Knudsen, respectively). Each of these chapters contains

a fairly developed treatment of primary source material and shows quite nicely how government leaders changed their policies over time. Unfortunately, this empirical richness is not accompanied by an equally satisfactory set of explanations. Instead, one finds ad hoc descriptions: "concern for the Swedish image"; "the policy-makers concluded that their traditional policy was ineffective in dealing with the problem, as presently defined, making the problem worse, generating new problems (i.e. in the domestic election arena) and costing much more than anticipated"; "in a most natural way, however, given the circumstances of Eastern and Central Europe at this time, the statements gave evidence of a process of 'structural probing': agents presented tentative or conditional analyses" (pp. 171, 193, 221).

The other individual studies are rather more difficult to characterize. On the one hand, they contain few theoretical claims about how foreign policy is supposed to be made. On the other hand, their empirical claims are couched at a high-enough order of abstraction as to be of little use for either theory evaluation or theory description. As a result, it is difficult to tell how conclusions in these studies are arrived at or even what they might mean for purposes of research. How, for example, is one to assess the claim that "the process of European integration may be seen as a two-level game" (p. 140) when the author never says what the game is about, who the players are, or what other ways of "seeing" integration are ruled out by adopting the game metaphor? How is one to understand a chapter in which "foreign economic policy theory" is criticized for an "orthodox distinction between what is considered economics and what is politics" (p. 76) when, three pages later, "the European context" is adduced to conclude that "it is plainly nonsense that the theoretical apparatus of foreign policy does not include foreign economic policy"? One is forced to conclude that the volume fails to achieve both the goal its editors set for themselves and the more modest one of contributing in some fashion to our understanding of foreign policy phenomena in Europe.

These shortcomings are too systematic to be attributable to time pressures or the inevitable difficulties of coordinating over a dozen scholars. Rather, they seem to stem from three types of confusion, each of which by itself would be debilitating for serious research. First, most of the contributors to the volume conflate theoretical perspectives with individual theories, attempting to use the former to analyze historical or contemporaneous phenomena. For example, we are told that both Kant and Keohane are "liberal theorists" and that the "liberal perspective" is better than others at accounting for "NATO decisions on military strategy and force deployments" (50, 56–57). Small wonder, then, that the individual chapters cannot say much about which theories "explain"—or even are remotely relevant for describing—foreign policy phenomena.

Second, almost without exception, every chapter in the volume conflates theories of foreign policymaking and theories of international relations tout court. This begins as early as page 3, in which "theories in the foreign policy analysis literature" are transmuted three lines later into "theories in the subject of international relations." We thus end up with "an analysis of foreign policy behavior . . . in the tradition of the realist school of thinking" or an invitation to "explore the potentials of

neo-realist foreign policy analysis" (pp. 123, 259). One result of this conceptual slide is that instead of studying the details of foreign policymaking phenomena (e.g., how thinking comes to be "grooved" how individuals become "hardball" politicians), the authors end up with the kind of high-order abstractions (e.g., "coordination," "supportive behavior") mentioned above.

Third, there is a pervasive confusion between meta-theory and theory. This again begins at the very start of the volume, in which, only a few pages after having described the task of theory evaluation assigned to the contributors, one of the editors then goes on to cite the "agency-structure debate" as implying that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for theories of foreign policy analysis to be cumulated or integrated (16–20). To be sure, the other editor disagrees with this stance (285–7); and perhaps as a result of this split, several of the contributors feel obliged to interpret their empirical material as bearing on the "debate," rather than on particular theories of foreign policy making (e.g., pp. 200, 221). One does not have to be an adherent of "positivism" as variously defined by one of the editors ("a notion of truth . . . that can be approached," "one truth, one world," "data and their neutrality," pp. 12, 18) to see that the attempt at bringing data to bear on metatheory will result, at best, in the sort of jargonistic descriptions quoted.

This analysis should not be taken as implying that there is no possibility of developing useful—indeed, critical—theories of foreign policymaking. Considerable work is going on in this vein, some of it explicitly aimed at understanding Europe in the post-Cold War era. Much of this research, however, is "grounded" (as the term is used in sociological theory) and thus does not proceed in the top-down, metatheory-first fashion of this volume. Perhaps, in several years time, the editors could be persuaded to compile a second, more modest, collection.

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**Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-Hegemonic Era.** Edited by Philip G. Cerny. Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1993. 234p. \$59.95.  
**States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s.** By Eric Helleiner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 244p. \$29.95.

The loosening of national regulations on banking, collapse of the post-World War II fixed exchange rate system, creation of new kinds of financial instruments and new capital markets, and sheer size of international transactions in currency, stocks, bonds, and other credit instruments have all led financial issues out of obscurity and onto the agendas of policymakers, analysts, and ordinary people. There is genuine concern over the impact of open financial markets on any government's ability to implement its policies, given the magnitude and speed of response from global financial markets. The response in the political science community has been a new wave of political-economic analysis of finance, from both a comparative and international perspective.

The books under review here—Eric Helleiner's *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance* and Philip Cerny's